fix(security): harden workspace bootstrap boundary reads

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 
 ### Fixes
 
+- Sandbox/Bootstrap context boundary hardening: reject symlink/hardlink alias bootstrap seed files that resolve outside the source workspace and switch post-compaction `AGENTS.md` context reads to boundary-verified file opens, preventing host file content from being injected via workspace aliasing. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
 - Gateway/Security hardening: tie loopback-origin dev allowance to actual local socket clients (not Host header claims), add explicit warnings/metrics when `gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyAllowHostHeaderOriginFallback` accepts websocket origins, harden safe-regex detection for quantified ambiguous alternation patterns (for example `(a|aa)+`), and bound large regex-evaluation inputs for session-filter and log-redaction paths.
 - Tests/Sandbox + archive portability: use junction-compatible directory-link setup on Windows and explicit file-symlink platform guards in symlink escape tests where unprivileged file symlinks are unavailable, reducing false Windows CI failures while preserving traversal checks on supported paths. (#28747) Thanks @arosstale.
 - Security/Skills archive extraction: unify tar extraction safety checks across tar.gz and tar.bz2 install flows, enforce tar compressed-size limits, and fail closed if tar.bz2 archives change between preflight and extraction to prevent bypasses of entry-type/size guardrails. Thanks @GCXWLP for reporting.

docs/concepts/agent-workspace.md

@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ inside a sandbox workspace under `~/.openclaw/sandboxes`, not your host workspac
 
 `openclaw onboard`, `openclaw configure`, or `openclaw setup` will create the
 workspace and seed the bootstrap files if they are missing.
+Sandbox seed copies only accept regular in-workspace files; symlink/hardlink
+aliases that resolve outside the source workspace are ignored.
 
 If you already manage the workspace files yourself, you can disable bootstrap
 file creation:

src/agents/pi-extensions/compaction-safeguard.test.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+import fs from "node:fs";
+import os from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
 import type { AgentMessage } from "@mariozechner/pi-agent-core";
 import type { Api, Model } from "@mariozechner/pi-ai";
 import type { ExtensionAPI, ExtensionContext } from "@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent";
@@ -13,6 +16,7 @@ const {
   formatToolFailuresSection,
   computeAdaptiveChunkRatio,
   isOversizedForSummary,
+  readWorkspaceContextForSummary,
   BASE_CHUNK_RATIO,
   MIN_CHUNK_RATIO,
   SAFETY_MARGIN,
@@ -484,3 +488,41 @@ describe("compaction-safeguard double-compaction guard", () => {
     expect(getApiKeyMock).toHaveBeenCalled();
   });
 });
+
+describe("readWorkspaceContextForSummary", () => {
+  it.runIf(process.platform !== "win32")(
+    "returns empty when AGENTS.md is a symlink escape",
+    async () => {
+      const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "openclaw-compaction-summary-"));
+      const prevCwd = process.cwd();
+      try {
+        const outside = path.join(root, "outside-secret.txt");
+        fs.writeFileSync(outside, "secret");
+        fs.symlinkSync(outside, path.join(root, "AGENTS.md"));
+        process.chdir(root);
+        await expect(readWorkspaceContextForSummary()).resolves.toBe("");
+      } finally {
+        process.chdir(prevCwd);
+        fs.rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
+      }
+    },
+  );
+
+  it.runIf(process.platform !== "win32")(
+    "returns empty when AGENTS.md is a hardlink alias",
+    async () => {
+      const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "openclaw-compaction-summary-"));
+      const prevCwd = process.cwd();
+      try {
+        const outside = path.join(root, "outside-secret.txt");
+        fs.writeFileSync(outside, "secret");
+        fs.linkSync(outside, path.join(root, "AGENTS.md"));
+        process.chdir(root);
+        await expect(readWorkspaceContextForSummary()).resolves.toBe("");
+      } finally {
+        process.chdir(prevCwd);
+        fs.rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
+      }
+    },
+  );
+});

src/agents/pi-extensions/compaction-safeguard.ts

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import path from "node:path";
 import type { AgentMessage } from "@mariozechner/pi-agent-core";
 import type { ExtensionAPI, FileOperations } from "@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent";
 import { extractSections } from "../../auto-reply/reply/post-compaction-context.js";
+import { openBoundaryFile } from "../../infra/boundary-file-read.js";
 import { createSubsystemLogger } from "../../logging/subsystem.js";
 import {
   BASE_CHUNK_RATIO,
@@ -169,11 +170,22 @@ async function readWorkspaceContextForSummary(): Promise<string> {
   const agentsPath = path.join(workspaceDir, "AGENTS.md");
 
   try {
-    if (!fs.existsSync(agentsPath)) {
+    const opened = await openBoundaryFile({
+      absolutePath: agentsPath,
+      rootPath: workspaceDir,
+      boundaryLabel: "workspace root",
+    });
+    if (!opened.ok) {
       return "";
     }
 
-    const content = await fs.promises.readFile(agentsPath, "utf-8");
+    const content = (() => {
+      try {
+        return fs.readFileSync(opened.fd, "utf-8");
+      } finally {
+        fs.closeSync(opened.fd);
+      }
+    })();
     const sections = extractSections(content, ["Session Startup", "Red Lines"]);
 
     if (sections.length === 0) {
@@ -392,6 +404,7 @@ export const __testing = {
   formatToolFailuresSection,
   computeAdaptiveChunkRatio,
   isOversizedForSummary,
+  readWorkspaceContextForSummary,
   BASE_CHUNK_RATIO,
   MIN_CHUNK_RATIO,
   SAFETY_MARGIN,

src/agents/sandbox/workspace.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+import fs from "node:fs/promises";
+import os from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { DEFAULT_AGENTS_FILENAME } from "../workspace.js";
+import { ensureSandboxWorkspace } from "./workspace.js";
+
+const tempRoots: string[] = [];
+
+async function makeTempRoot(): Promise<string> {
+  const root = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "openclaw-sandbox-workspace-"));
+  tempRoots.push(root);
+  return root;
+}
+
+afterEach(async () => {
+  await Promise.all(
+    tempRoots.splice(0).map((root) => fs.rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true })),
+  );
+});
+
+describe("ensureSandboxWorkspace", () => {
+  it("seeds regular bootstrap files from the source workspace", async () => {
+    const root = await makeTempRoot();
+    const seed = path.join(root, "seed");
+    const sandbox = path.join(root, "sandbox");
+    await fs.mkdir(seed, { recursive: true });
+    await fs.writeFile(path.join(seed, DEFAULT_AGENTS_FILENAME), "seeded-agents", "utf-8");
+
+    await ensureSandboxWorkspace(sandbox, seed, true);
+
+    await expect(fs.readFile(path.join(sandbox, DEFAULT_AGENTS_FILENAME), "utf-8")).resolves.toBe(
+      "seeded-agents",
+    );
+  });
+
+  it.runIf(process.platform !== "win32")("skips symlinked bootstrap seed files", async () => {
+    const root = await makeTempRoot();
+    const seed = path.join(root, "seed");
+    const sandbox = path.join(root, "sandbox");
+    const outside = path.join(root, "outside-secret.txt");
+    await fs.mkdir(seed, { recursive: true });
+    await fs.writeFile(outside, "secret", "utf-8");
+    await fs.symlink(outside, path.join(seed, DEFAULT_AGENTS_FILENAME));
+
+    await ensureSandboxWorkspace(sandbox, seed, true);
+
+    await expect(
+      fs.readFile(path.join(sandbox, DEFAULT_AGENTS_FILENAME), "utf-8"),
+    ).rejects.toBeDefined();
+  });
+
+  it.runIf(process.platform !== "win32")("skips hardlinked bootstrap seed files", async () => {
+    const root = await makeTempRoot();
+    const seed = path.join(root, "seed");
+    const sandbox = path.join(root, "sandbox");
+    const outside = path.join(root, "outside-agents.txt");
+    const linkedSeed = path.join(seed, DEFAULT_AGENTS_FILENAME);
+    await fs.mkdir(seed, { recursive: true });
+    await fs.writeFile(outside, "outside", "utf-8");
+    try {
+      await fs.link(outside, linkedSeed);
+    } catch (error) {
+      if ((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === "EXDEV") {
+        return;
+      }
+      throw error;
+    }
+
+    await ensureSandboxWorkspace(sandbox, seed, true);
+
+    await expect(
+      fs.readFile(path.join(sandbox, DEFAULT_AGENTS_FILENAME), "utf-8"),
+    ).rejects.toBeDefined();
+  });
+});

src/agents/sandbox/workspace.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
+import syncFs from "node:fs";
 import fs from "node:fs/promises";
 import path from "node:path";
+import { openBoundaryFile } from "../../infra/boundary-file-read.js";
 import { resolveUserPath } from "../../utils.js";
 import {
   DEFAULT_AGENTS_FILENAME,
@@ -36,8 +38,20 @@ export async function ensureSandboxWorkspace(
         await fs.access(dest);
       } catch {
         try {
-          const content = await fs.readFile(src, "utf-8");
+          const opened = await openBoundaryFile({
-          await fs.writeFile(dest, content, { encoding: "utf-8", flag: "wx" });
+            absolutePath: src,
+            rootPath: seed,
+            boundaryLabel: "sandbox seed workspace",
+          });
+          if (!opened.ok) {
+            continue;
+          }
+          try {
+            const content = syncFs.readFileSync(opened.fd, "utf-8");
+            await fs.writeFile(dest, content, { encoding: "utf-8", flag: "wx" });
+          } finally {
+            syncFs.closeSync(opened.fd);
+          }
         } catch {
           // ignore missing seed file
         }

src/auto-reply/reply/post-compaction-context.test.ts

@@ -166,4 +166,28 @@ Never do Y.
     expect(result).toContain("Rule 2");
     expect(result).not.toContain("Other Section");
   });
+
+  it.runIf(process.platform !== "win32")(
+    "returns null when AGENTS.md is a symlink escaping workspace",
+    async () => {
+      const outside = path.join(tmpDir, "outside-secret.txt");
+      fs.writeFileSync(outside, "secret");
+      fs.symlinkSync(outside, path.join(tmpDir, "AGENTS.md"));
+
+      const result = await readPostCompactionContext(tmpDir);
+      expect(result).toBeNull();
+    },
+  );
+
+  it.runIf(process.platform !== "win32")(
+    "returns null when AGENTS.md is a hardlink alias",
+    async () => {
+      const outside = path.join(tmpDir, "outside-secret.txt");
+      fs.writeFileSync(outside, "secret");
+      fs.linkSync(outside, path.join(tmpDir, "AGENTS.md"));
+
+      const result = await readPostCompactionContext(tmpDir);
+      expect(result).toBeNull();
+    },
+  );
 });

src/auto-reply/reply/post-compaction-context.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import fs from "node:fs";
 import path from "node:path";
+import { openBoundaryFile } from "../../infra/boundary-file-read.js";
 
 const MAX_CONTEXT_CHARS = 3000;
 
@@ -11,11 +12,21 @@ export async function readPostCompactionContext(workspaceDir: string): Promise<s
   const agentsPath = path.join(workspaceDir, "AGENTS.md");
 
   try {
-    if (!fs.existsSync(agentsPath)) {
+    const opened = await openBoundaryFile({
+      absolutePath: agentsPath,
+      rootPath: workspaceDir,
+      boundaryLabel: "workspace root",
+    });
+    if (!opened.ok) {
       return null;
     }
-
+    const content = (() => {
-    const content = await fs.promises.readFile(agentsPath, "utf-8");
+      try {
+        return fs.readFileSync(opened.fd, "utf-8");
+      } finally {
+        fs.closeSync(opened.fd);
+      }
+    })();
 
     // Extract "## Session Startup" and "## Red Lines" sections
     // Each section ends at the next "## " heading or end of file