fix(security): force sandbox browser hash migration and audit stale labels
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@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ This is for cooperative/shared inbox hardening. A single Gateway shared by mutua
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It also warns when small models (`<=300B`) are used without sandboxing and with web/browser tools enabled.
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For webhook ingress, it warns when `hooks.defaultSessionKey` is unset, when request `sessionKey` overrides are enabled, and when overrides are enabled without `hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes`.
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It also warns when sandbox Docker settings are configured while sandbox mode is off, when `gateway.nodes.denyCommands` uses ineffective pattern-like/unknown entries, when global `tools.profile="minimal"` is overridden by agent tool profiles, and when installed extension plugin tools may be reachable under permissive tool policy.
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It also warns when existing sandbox browser Docker containers have missing/stale hash labels (for example pre-migration containers missing `openclaw.browserConfigEpoch`) and recommends `openclaw sandbox recreate --browser --all`.
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It also warns when npm-based plugin/hook install records are unpinned, missing integrity metadata, or drift from currently installed package versions.
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It warns when `gateway.auth.mode="none"` leaves Gateway HTTP APIs reachable without a shared secret (`/tools/invoke` plus any enabled `/v1/*` endpoint).
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