diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index fb93b2f6f..e431f59b4 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 - Media understanding/audio transcription guard: skip tiny/empty audio files (<1024 bytes) before provider/CLI transcription to avoid noisy invalid-audio failures and preserve clean fallback behavior. (#8388) Thanks @Glucksberg.
 - OpenAI media capabilities: include `audio` in the OpenAI provider capability list so audio transcription models are eligible in media-understanding provider selection. (#12717) Thanks @openjay.
 - Security/Node exec approvals: preserve shell/dispatch-wrapper argv semantics during approval hardening so approved wrapper commands (for example `env sh -c ...`) cannot drift into a different runtime command shape, and add regression coverage for both approval-plan generation and approved runtime execution paths. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- Security/Node exec approvals: revalidate approval-bound `cwd` identity immediately before execution/forwarding and fail closed with an explicit denial when `cwd` drifts after approval hardening.
 - Security/ACP sandbox inheritance: enforce fail-closed runtime guardrails for `sessions_spawn` with `runtime="acp"` by rejecting ACP spawns from sandboxed requester sessions and rejecting `sandbox="require"` for ACP runtime, preventing sandbox-boundary bypass via host-side ACP initialization. (#32254) Thanks @tdjackey for reporting, and @dutifulbob for the fix.
 - Browser/Security output boundary hardening: replace check-then-rename output commits with root-bound fd-verified writes, unify install/skills canonical path-boundary checks, and add regression coverage for symlink-rebind race paths across browser output and shared fs-safe write flows. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
 - Security/fs-safe write hardening: make `writeFileWithinRoot` use same-directory temp writes plus atomic rename, add post-write inode/hardlink revalidation with security warnings on boundary drift, and avoid truncating existing targets when final rename fails.
diff --git a/src/node-host/invoke-system-run.test.ts b/src/node-host/invoke-system-run.test.ts
index c7f63d453..a09477804 100644
--- a/src/node-host/invoke-system-run.test.ts
+++ b/src/node-host/invoke-system-run.test.ts
@@ -576,6 +576,55 @@ describe("handleSystemRunInvoke mac app exec host routing", () => {
     }
   });
 
+  it("denies approval-based execution when cwd identity drifts before execution", async () => {
+    const tmp = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "openclaw-approval-cwd-drift-"));
+    const fallback = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "openclaw-approval-cwd-drift-alt-"));
+    const script = path.join(tmp, "run.sh");
+    fs.writeFileSync(script, "#!/bin/sh\necho SAFE\n");
+    fs.chmodSync(script, 0o755);
+    const canonicalCwd = fs.realpathSync(tmp);
+    const realStatSync = fs.statSync.bind(fs);
+    let targetStatCalls = 0;
+    const driftStat = realStatSync(fallback);
+    const statSpy = vi.spyOn(fs, "statSync").mockImplementation((...args) => {
+      const [target] = args;
+      const resolvedTarget =
+        typeof target === "string"
+          ? path.resolve(target)
+          : Buffer.isBuffer(target)
+            ? path.resolve(target.toString())
+            : target instanceof URL
+              ? path.resolve(target.pathname)
+              : path.resolve(String(target));
+      if (resolvedTarget === canonicalCwd) {
+        targetStatCalls += 1;
+        if (targetStatCalls >= 3) {
+          return driftStat;
+        }
+      }
+      return realStatSync(...args);
+    });
+    try {
+      const { runCommand, sendInvokeResult } = await runSystemInvoke({
+        preferMacAppExecHost: false,
+        command: ["./run.sh"],
+        cwd: tmp,
+        approved: true,
+        security: "full",
+        ask: "off",
+      });
+      expect(runCommand).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expectInvokeErrorMessage(sendInvokeResult, {
+        message: "SYSTEM_RUN_DENIED: approval cwd changed before execution",
+        exact: true,
+      });
+    } finally {
+      statSpy.mockRestore();
+      fs.rmSync(tmp, { recursive: true, force: true });
+      fs.rmSync(fallback, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
+
   it("denies ./sh wrapper spoof in allowlist on-miss mode before execution", async () => {
     const marker = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `openclaw-wrapper-spoof-${process.pid}-${Date.now()}`);
     const runCommand = vi.fn(async () => {
diff --git a/src/node-host/invoke-system-run.ts b/src/node-host/invoke-system-run.ts
index 78e5d589f..9f6976df3 100644
--- a/src/node-host/invoke-system-run.ts
+++ b/src/node-host/invoke-system-run.ts
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import crypto from "node:crypto";
+import fs from "node:fs";
 import { resolveAgentConfig } from "../agents/agent-scope.js";
 import { loadConfig } from "../config/config.js";
 import type { GatewayClient } from "../gateway/client.js";
@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ import {
 } from "../infra/exec-approvals.js";
 import type { ExecHostRequest, ExecHostResponse, ExecHostRunResult } from "../infra/exec-host.js";
 import { resolveExecSafeBinRuntimePolicy } from "../infra/exec-safe-bin-runtime-policy.js";
+import { sameFileIdentity } from "../infra/file-identity.js";
 import { sanitizeSystemRunEnvOverrides } from "../infra/host-env-security.js";
 import { resolveSystemRunCommand } from "../infra/system-run-command.js";
 import { evaluateSystemRunPolicy, resolveExecApprovalDecision } from "./exec-policy.js";
@@ -81,9 +83,12 @@ type SystemRunPolicyPhase = SystemRunParsePhase & {
   segments: ExecCommandSegment[];
   plannedAllowlistArgv: string[] | undefined;
   isWindows: boolean;
+  approvedCwdStat: fs.Stats | undefined;
 };
 
 const safeBinTrustedDirWarningCache = new Set<string>();
+const APPROVAL_CWD_DRIFT_DENIED_MESSAGE =
+  "SYSTEM_RUN_DENIED: approval cwd changed before execution";
 
 function warnWritableTrustedDirOnce(message: string): void {
   if (safeBinTrustedDirWarningCache.has(message)) {
@@ -107,6 +112,36 @@ function normalizeDeniedReason(reason: string | null | undefined): SystemRunDeni
   }
 }
 
+function revalidateApprovedCwdBeforeExecution(
+  phase: SystemRunPolicyPhase,
+): { ok: true } | { ok: false } {
+  if (!phase.policy.approvedByAsk || !phase.cwd || !phase.approvedCwdStat) {
+    return { ok: true };
+  }
+  const hardened = hardenApprovedExecutionPaths({
+    approvedByAsk: true,
+    argv: [],
+    shellCommand: null,
+    cwd: phase.cwd,
+  });
+  if (!hardened.ok || hardened.cwd !== phase.cwd) {
+    return { ok: false };
+  }
+  let currentCwdStat: fs.Stats;
+  try {
+    currentCwdStat = fs.statSync(phase.cwd);
+  } catch {
+    return { ok: false };
+  }
+  if (!currentCwdStat.isDirectory()) {
+    return { ok: false };
+  }
+  if (!sameFileIdentity(phase.approvedCwdStat, currentCwdStat)) {
+    return { ok: false };
+  }
+  return { ok: true };
+}
+
 export type HandleSystemRunInvokeOptions = {
   client: GatewayClient;
   params: SystemRunParams;
@@ -299,6 +334,25 @@ async function evaluateSystemRunPolicyPhase(
     });
     return null;
   }
+  let approvedCwdStat: fs.Stats | undefined;
+  if (policy.approvedByAsk && hardenedPaths.cwd) {
+    try {
+      approvedCwdStat = fs.statSync(hardenedPaths.cwd);
+    } catch {
+      await sendSystemRunDenied(opts, parsed.execution, {
+        reason: "approval-required",
+        message: APPROVAL_CWD_DRIFT_DENIED_MESSAGE,
+      });
+      return null;
+    }
+    if (!approvedCwdStat.isDirectory()) {
+      await sendSystemRunDenied(opts, parsed.execution, {
+        reason: "approval-required",
+        message: APPROVAL_CWD_DRIFT_DENIED_MESSAGE,
+      });
+      return null;
+    }
+  }
 
   const plannedAllowlistArgv = resolvePlannedAllowlistArgv({
     security,
@@ -326,6 +380,7 @@ async function evaluateSystemRunPolicyPhase(
     segments,
     plannedAllowlistArgv: plannedAllowlistArgv ?? undefined,
     isWindows,
+    approvedCwdStat,
   };
 }
 
@@ -333,6 +388,18 @@ async function executeSystemRunPhase(
   opts: HandleSystemRunInvokeOptions,
   phase: SystemRunPolicyPhase,
 ): Promise<void> {
+  const cwdRevalidation = revalidateApprovedCwdBeforeExecution(phase);
+  if (!cwdRevalidation.ok) {
+    console.warn(
+      `[security] system.run approval cwd drift blocked: runId=${phase.runId} cwd=${phase.cwd ?? ""}`,
+    );
+    await sendSystemRunDenied(opts, phase.execution, {
+      reason: "approval-required",
+      message: APPROVAL_CWD_DRIFT_DENIED_MESSAGE,
+    });
+    return;
+  }
+
   const useMacAppExec = opts.preferMacAppExecHost;
   if (useMacAppExec) {
     const execRequest: ExecHostRequest = {