Security: expand audit checks for mDNS and real-IP fallback

This commit is contained in:
Brian Mendonca
2026-02-22 02:38:58 -07:00
committed by Peter Steinberger
parent b13fc7eccd
commit bc78b343ba
4 changed files with 155 additions and 25 deletions

View File

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ This is for cooperative/shared inbox hardening. A single Gateway shared by mutua
It also warns when small models (`<=300B`) are used without sandboxing and with web/browser tools enabled.
For webhook ingress, it warns when `hooks.defaultSessionKey` is unset, when request `sessionKey` overrides are enabled, and when overrides are enabled without `hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes`.
It also warns when sandbox Docker settings are configured while sandbox mode is off, when `gateway.nodes.denyCommands` uses ineffective pattern-like/unknown entries, when `gateway.nodes.allowCommands` explicitly enables dangerous node commands, when global `tools.profile="minimal"` is overridden by agent tool profiles, when open groups expose runtime/filesystem tools without sandbox/workspace guards, and when installed extension plugin tools may be reachable under permissive tool policy.
It also flags `gateway.allowRealIpFallback=true` (header-spoofing risk if proxies are misconfigured) and `discovery.mdns.mode="full"` (metadata leakage via mDNS TXT records).
It also warns when sandbox browser uses Docker `bridge` network without `sandbox.browser.cdpSourceRange`.
It also warns when existing sandbox browser Docker containers have missing/stale hash labels (for example pre-migration containers missing `openclaw.browserConfigEpoch`) and recommends `openclaw sandbox recreate --browser --all`.
It also warns when npm-based plugin/hook install records are unpinned, missing integrity metadata, or drift from currently installed package versions.