* fix(tui): strip inbound metadata blocks from user text
* chore: clean up metadata-strip format and changelog credit
* chore: format tui metadata-strip tests
* test(web): isolate local media fixture paths to allow-listed roots
* fix(ui): strip injected inbound metadata from user messages in history
Fixes#21106Fixes#21109Fixes#22116
OpenClaw prepends structured metadata blocks ("Conversation info",
"Sender:", reply-context) to user messages before sending them to the
LLM. These blocks are intentionally AI-context-only and must never reach
the chat history that users see.
Root cause:
`buildInboundUserContextPrefix` in `inbound-meta.ts` prepends the
blocks directly to the stored user message content string, so they are
persisted verbatim and later shown in webchat, TUI, and every other
rendering surface.
Fix:
• `src/auto-reply/reply/strip-inbound-meta.ts` — new utility with a
6-sentinel fast-path strip (zero-alloc on miss) + 9-test suite.
• `src/tui/tui-session-actions.ts` — wraps `chatLog.addUser(...)` with
`stripInboundMetadata()` so the TUI never stores the prefix.
• `ui/src/ui/chat/message-normalizer.ts` — strips user-role text content
items during normalisation so webchat renders clean messages.
* fix(ui): strip inbound metadata for user messages in display path
* test: fix discord component send test spread typing
* fix: strip inbound metadata from mac chat history decode
* fix: align Swift metadata stripping parser with TS implementation
* fix: normalize line endings in inbound metadata stripper
* chore: document Swift/TS metadata-sentinel ownership
* chore: update changelog for inbound metadata strip fix
* changelog: credit Mellowambience for 22142
---------
Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <vincentkoc@ieee.org>
* fix(security): block plaintext WebSocket connections to non-loopback addresses
Addresses CWE-319 (Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information).
Previously, ws:// connections to remote hosts were allowed, exposing
both credentials and chat data to network interception. This change
blocks ALL plaintext ws:// connections to non-loopback addresses,
regardless of whether explicit credentials are configured (device
tokens may be loaded dynamically).
Security policy:
- wss:// allowed to any host
- ws:// allowed only to loopback (127.x.x.x, localhost, ::1)
- ws:// to LAN/tailnet/remote hosts now requires TLS
Changes:
- Add isSecureWebSocketUrl() validation in net.ts
- Block insecure connections in GatewayClient.start()
- Block insecure URLs in buildGatewayConnectionDetails()
- Handle malformed URLs gracefully without crashing
- Update tests to use wss:// for non-loopback URLs
Fixes#12519
* fix(test): update gateway-chat mock to preserve net.js exports
Use importOriginal to spread actual module exports and mock only
the functions needed for testing. This ensures isSecureWebSocketUrl
and other exports remain available to the code under test.
